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Abstract
We consider the problem of the existence of natural improvement dynamics leading to approximate
pure Nash equilibria, with a reasonable small approximation, and the problem of bounding the
efficiency of such equilibria in the fundamental framework of weighted congestion game with
polynomial latencies of degree at most d ≥ 1.
In this work, by exploiting a simple technique, we firstly show that the game always admits a
d-approximate potential function. This implies that every sequence of d-approximate improvement
moves by the players always leads the game to a d-approximate pure Nash equilibrium. As a corollary,
we also obtain that, under mild assumptions on the structure of the players’ strategies, the game
always admits a constant approximate potential function. Secondly, by using a simple potential
function argument, we are able to show that in the game there always exists a (d+ δ)-approximate
pure Nash equilibrium, with δ ∈ [0, 1], whose cost is 2/(1 + δ) times the cost of an optimal state.
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1 Introduction
Among other solution concepts, the notion of pure Nash equilibrium plays a central role in
Game Theory. Pure Nash equilibria in a game characterize situations in which no player
has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from the current situation in order to achieve a
higher payoff. Unfortunately, it is well known that there are games that do not have pure
Nash equilibria. Furthermore, even in games where the existence of pure Nash equilibria is
guaranteed, these equilibria could be very inefficient compared to solutions dictated by a
central authority. Such negative results significantly question the importance of pure Nash
equilibria as solution concepts that characterize the behavior of rational players.
One way to overcome the limitations of the non-existence and inefficiency of pure Nash
equilibria is to consider a relaxation of the stability constraints. This relaxation leads to the
concept of approximate pure Nash equilibrium. This concept characterizes situations where
no player can significantly improve her payoff by unilaterally deviating from her current
strategy. Approximate pure Nash equilibria can accommodate small modeling inaccuracies
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solution concepts in practical decision-making settings. Beside mere existence and efficiency,
approximate pure Nash equilibria are also an appealing alternative solution concept from a
computational point of view [2, 4].
In this work, we investigate the existence and efficiency of approximate pure Nash
equilibria in the context of the weighted congestion game. This game is a general framework
which models situations in which a group of agents compete for the use of a set of shared
resources. In the following, we introduce weighted congestion games and give a formal
statement of the problems we address. We conclude this section with a discussion about the
current literature and a detailed presentation of our contribution.
Weighted congestion games. In a weighted congestion game, players compete over a set
of resources. Each player has a positive weight. Each resource incurs a latency to all players
using it; this latency depends on the total weight (congestion) of the players that use the
resource according to a resource-specific, non-negative, and non-decreasing latency function.
Among a given set of strategies (over sets of resources), each player aims to select one selfishly,
trying to minimize her individual total cost, i.e., the sum of the latencies on the resources in
her strategy. Typical examples include weighted congestion games in networks, where the
network links correspond to the resources and each player has alternative paths that connect
two nodes as strategies. Now, let us describe the game more formally.
The weighted congestion game with polynomial latencies of degree at most
d ∈ Z≥1 is a collection of instances, denoted by WCG(d), of the form G =
〈N,E, (wi)i∈N , (Si)i∈N , (ae, ke)e∈E〉, where N = {1, 2, . . . , |N |} is the set of play-
ers, E = {1, 2, . . . , |E|} is the set of resources, wi ∈ R>0 is the weight of player i,
Si ⊆ 2E is the set of strategies of player i and (ae, ke) ∈ R>0 × {1, 2, . . . , d} are the
coefficient and the degree of resource e ∈ E respectively, which encode the latency
function `e : 2N 7→ R≥0 associated with e, mapping every subset of players P ⊆ N





The set of states of G is denoted by S(G) = S1 × S2 × . . .× S|N |. For every state s
we refer to its i-th component, that is the strategy played by player i in s, by s(i).
For every state s and resource e ∈ E, we denote by Le(s) the set of players using
resource e in s, i.e., Le(s) = {j ∈ N : e ∈ s(i)}. We refer to the sum of the weights
of all the players in Le(s) as the congestion of e in s. For every state s ∈ S(G), the
cost incurred by player i ∈ N in s is ci(s) =
∑
e∈s(i) `e(Le(s)), while the social cost
of s is the weighted sum of the players’ costs, i.e., C(s) =
∑
i∈N wici(s). Notice







. Let wmax be the greatest weight in G, we
say that G is mildly congested if `e(Le(s)) ≥ (ke + 1)wmax, for every resource e ∈ E
and state s ∈ S(G).
Preliminary definitions. We now introduce concepts that are necessary to formally state
our problems and present our results.
Let us consider an instance G = 〈N,E, (wi)i∈N , (Si)i∈N , (ae, ke)e∈E〉 of WCG(d). For every
state s ∈ S(G) and every s ∈ Si, we denote by [s−i, s] the new state obtained from s by setting
the i-th component, that is the strategy of i, to s and keeping all the remaining components
unchanged, i.e., [s−i, s](i) = s. The transition from s to [s−i, s] is called a move of player i
from state s. For α ≥ 1, we say that a transition from s to [s−i, s] is an α-improvement move
for i if αci([s−i, s]) ≤ ci(s) (it is a strictly α-improvement if αci([s−i, s]) < ci(s)). For α ≥ 1,
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we say that a state-value function Γ : S(G) 7→ R≥0 is an α-approximate potential function for
G if it strictly decreases at every strictly α-improvement move; formally, Γ([s−i, s]) < Γ(s)
whenever αci([s−i, s]) < ci(s). If G admits an α-approximate potential function Γ then
every sequence of strictly α-improvement moves leads to a local optimum of Γ, that is a
state in which no further strictly improvement move can be performed; such a state is called
α-approximate pure Nash equilibrium. Formally, for α ≥ 1, we say that a state s ∈ S(G) is
an α-approximate pure Nash equilibrium if, for every player i ∈ N and every strategy s ∈ Si,
we have ci(s) ≤ αci([s−i, s]). If α = 1 we simply refer to s as a pure Nash equilibrium rather
than a 1-approximate pure Nash equilibrium. For α ≥ 1, we denote by Eα(G) ⊆ S(G) the
set of all α-approximate pure Nash equilibria of G. Every state s ∈ S(G) minimizing the
social cost is called a social optimum. We denote by OPT (G) the set of social optima of
G, i.e., OPT (G) = arg mins∈S(G) C(s). Let o ∈ OPT (G) be any social optimum of G, we
define the α-approximate price of stability of G as PoSα(G) = mine∈Eα(G)
C(e)
C(o) .
Problem statement. In this work we consider the problem of the existence of natural
improvement dynamics leading to approximate pure Nash equilibria, with a reasonable
small approximation, and the problem of bounding the efficiency of such equilibria in the
fundamental framework of weighted congestion game with polynomial latencies of degree at
most d ≥ 1. We formally state such problems as follows.
(i) Existence of Convergent sequences of α-improvement moves. In
this problem, given any instance G of WCG(d), we seek for a reasonable small
α ≥ 1 for which any sequence of α-improvement moves in G converges to an
α-approximate pure Nash equilibrium. This would be equivalent to say that
G admits an α-approximate potential function, whose value decreases at every
α-improvement move and whose local optima coincide with α-approximate
pure Nash equilibria.
(ii) Bounding the approximate price of stability. In this problem, given
any instance G of WCG(d), which admits an α-approximate pure Nash equilib-
rium, we aim at bounding the α-approximate price of stability of G.
Related work. The unweighted congestion game (i.e., when all players have unit weight)
has been widely studied in the literature. Rosenthal [16] proved that this game admits
a 1-approximate potential function. This immediately implies that every sequence of 1-
improvement moves by the players leads the game to a pure Nash equilibrium. For the
weighted congestion game, a 1-approximate potential function exists only when the latencies
are linear or exponential [10, 13, 15]. For polynomial latencies (of constant maximum degree
strictly higher than 1), pure Nash equilibria may not exist [10, 11, 14]. In general, for
arbitrary latencies, the problem of deciding whether a given instance of weighted congestion
game has a pure Nash equilibrium is NP-hard [9]. Caragiannis et al. [2] proved that
every instance of weighted congestion game with polynomial latencies of degree at most d
admits a d!-approximate potential function. This results has been subsequently improved by
Hansknecht et al. [12]; they showed that every instance of weighted congestion game with
polynomial latencies admits a (d+ 1)-approximate potential function. The potential function
they proposed is a Rosenthal-like potential function. Roughly speaking, they obtained
an approximate potential as follows. For each resource, they chose an appropriate fixed
ordering of the players. Then, for each resource separately, they computed a discrete integral.
Specifically, they sum up the latency of the resource after introducing the first player multiplied
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with the weight of the first player, the latency after introducing the first two players multiplied
with the weight of the second player, and so on, i.e., w1`e({w1}) + w2`e({w1 + w2}) + . . ..
The potential obtained depends on the way the players have been initially ordered. The
authors showed that, the potential function providing the best approximation for polynomial
latencies, that is d+ 1, is the one obtained by ordering the players in non-decreasing order in
terms of their weights, i.e., w1 ≤ w2 ≤ . . ..
For the 1-approximate price of stability, for the unweighted game, there exists a bound
of 1.577 for linear latencies [8, 3] and a bound of Θ(d) for polynomial latencies [6]. The
1-approximate price of stability for the weighted game with polynomial latencies has been
recently investigated in [7]; they provided a lower bound of Ω(d/ log d)d+1, matching the
upper bound in [1]. The authors also showed bounds to the α-approximate price of stability.
Specifically, they proved that for the weighted congestion game with polynomial latencies
and weights ranging in [1,W ], there exists an α-approximate pure Nash equilibrium, for any
α in the range [ 2(d+1)W2W+d+1 , d+ 1], whose cost is 1 + (
d+1
α − 1)W the cost of any optimal state.
Their proof exploits a potential function called Faulhaber’s potential.
Our contribution. Concerning the first problem, we show (Theorem 3) that every instance
of WCG(d) admits in general d-approximate potential functions. This implies that every
sequence of d-approximate improvement moves by the players always leads the game to
a d-approximate pure Nash equilibrium. This result is achieved by using the technique
formalised in Theorem 2 and the class of state-value functions Φγ defined in Definition
1. Essentially, while Definition 1 provides a simple interesting class of candidate potential
functions, Theorem 2 gives a local condition to each resource to determine the approximation
guarantee achieved by a given state-value function. So, by exploiting Theorem 2, in Theorem
3 we are able to show that the class Φγ contains d-approximate potential functions and, more
generally, (d + δ)-approximate potential functions, for every δ ≥ 0. We remark that, our
potential functions are substantially different from the potential function proposed in [12]. In
fact, while the potential in [12] is obtained in a Rosenthal-like fashion, by ordering the players
and summing their costs, by assuming that each player is affected only by the congestion
caused by preceding players in the ordering, our potential, more simply, is obtained by a
suitable scaling of the coefficients of the polynomials. As a matter of fact, our potentials,
despite their simplicity, provide an approximation of d instead of d+ 1; although it is worth
noticing that, for very small degrees, the two approaches provide the same approximation
guarantee. As a corollary of Theorem 3, we also show (Corollary 4) that the social optimum
of an instance of WCG(d) is always a (d+ 1)-approximate pure Nash equilibrium, as it has
already been observed in [7]. More importantly, Theorem 3 implies that, as state by Corollary
5, every mildly congested instance of WCG(d) always admits a ee−1 -approximate potential
function, where e is the Euler’s number.
We also show that, the class of functions Φγ also serves as an essential tool to give a
constant bound on the approximate price of stability. In fact, by exploiting Φγ , we are
able to show (Theorem 8) an upper bound of 2/(1 + δ) for the (d+ δ)-approximate price of
stability, for every δ ∈ [0, 1]. To prove this bound, we use the standard potential function
argument. Specifically, we first give bounds (Lemma 6 and Lemma 7) relating the value of
the (d+ δ)-approximate potential function for a given state to the social cost of that state; if
we then perform a sequence of (d+ δ)-improvement moves starting from an optimal state,
the potential does not increase, and hence we can bound the cost of any (d+ δ)-approximate
pure Nash equilibrium that we reach. Notice that our bound does not depend on the range
of the players’ weights and significantly improves the bound provided in [7], by making use
of a different and simpler potential function.
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Roadmap. We begin with the definition of a class of state-value functions in Section 2.
In Section 3 we first present a simple technique to bound the approximation guarantee of
a given state-value function, subsequently we show that some elements of the class intro-
duced in Section 2 provide a good approximation. In Section 4 we present the bound on
the approximate price of stability. Finally, in section 5 we present a couple of technical lemmas.
2 A class of state-value functions
In this section we define a class of functions mapping every state of the game to a non-negative
real number. This class of functions will be exploited in the subsequent sections.
I Definition 1. Let G = 〈N,E, (wi)i∈N , (Si)i∈N , (ae, ke)e∈E〉 be an instance of WCG(d). For









where, for every nonempty subset of players P ⊆ N , we have











3 Approximate potential functions
The main result of this section is stated by Theorem 3, where we show the existence of
good approximate potential functions. Before showing this result, in Theorem 2 we illustrate
our tool to define an approximate potential function. Such tool gives a local condition to
each resource to determine the approximation guarantee of a given state-value function. We
conclude this section with two corollaries, the first (Corollary 4) showing that the social
optimum of an instance of WCG(d) is always a (d+ 1)-approximate pure Nash equilibrium,
the second (Corollary 5) showing that, under mild conditions, the game always admits a
constant approximate potential function.
I Theorem 2. Let G = 〈N,E, (wi)i∈N , (Si)i∈N , (ae, ke)e∈E〉 be an instance of WCG(d). Let







Γe : 2N 7→ R>0. If, for every resource e ∈ E, every non-empty subset of players P ⊆ N and




Γe(P )− Γe(P \ {i})
) ∈ [λe, υe] (1)





-approximate potential function for G, where υ = maxe∈E υe and λ =
mine∈E λe.
Proof. Let us consider a state s ∈ S(G) and a player i. Let us assume that i can perform an
υ
λ -improvement move by replacing strategy s(i) with s 6= s(i), i.e.,
υ
λci([s−i, s]) < ci(s). In
order to prove the claim we need to show that Γ([s−i, s]) < Γ(s). To this aim, let us bound
the expression Γ([s−i, s])− Γ(s). We have,
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where (2) follows from the fact that for every e ∈ s(i) ∩ s the variation of Γe is null since
Le([s−i, s]) = Le(s), (3) from (1), (4) from the definition of λ and υ and (5) from the
definition of cost.
From (5) we obtain that, if υλci([s−i, s]) < ci(s) then Γ([s−i, s]) < Γ(s), from which the
claim follows. J
We are ready to present the main result of this section.
I Theorem 3. Let G = 〈N,E, (wi)i∈N , (Si)i∈N , (ae, ke)e∈E〉 be an instance of WCG(d). It
holds that













)ke+1 + keke+1 − 1ke+1xke+1 ≤ d; (6)
(b) if γe = ke, for every e ∈ E, then Φγ is a d-approximate potential function for G;
(c) if γe = ke + δ, for every e ∈ E and δ ≥ 0, then Φγ is a (d + δ)-approximate potential
function for G.
Proof. We prove the claim using Theorem 2. Therefore, for every resource e ∈ E, every




Ψγee (P )−Ψγee (P \ {i})
) . (7)
Let us explicitly rewrite the numerator and denominator of the previous expression. We
distinguish between the cases |P | = {i} and |P | ≥ 2.
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Let us fist assume |P | = {i}. In this case, for wi`e(P ) we get
wi`e(P ) = wiae(wi)ke = aewke+1i . (8)
On the other hand, for the expression Ψγee (P )−Ψγee (P \ {i}), using Definition 1, we have











− 0 = wke+1j . (9)











Not let us assume that |P | ≥ 2. In this case, for wi`e(P ) we get











1 + λi(P )
)ke
. (11)




j∈P\{i} wj . Using Definition 1, we have
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1 + λi(P )








Therefore, by combining (11) and (12), we conclude that, for |P | ≥ 2, for the expression (7)
we have
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1 + λi(P )









1 + λi(P )
)ke+1 + (1− γeke+1)− γeke+1λi(P )ke+1 . (13)
Now we apply Lemma 9 to (13), by setting x = λi(P ), h = ke and β = γe.




Ψγee (P )−Ψγee (P \ {i})
) ∈ [1, ke]. (14)
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Ψγee (P )−Ψγee (P \ {i})





Claim (a) follows by combining (10), (13) and (14), and by applying Theorem 2. Claims
(b) and (c) follow by combining (10), (15) and (16), and by applying Theorem 2. J
I Corollary 4. Let G = 〈N,E, (wi)i∈N , (Si)i∈N , (ae, ke)e∈E〉 be an instance of WCG(d). Any
social optimum of G is a (d+ 1)-approximate pure Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let us consider the function Φγ(s) =
∑
e∈E Ψγee (Le(s)) (defined in Definition 1), with
γe = ke + 1. The claim follows from observing that Φγ(s) = C(s) and from the fact that, by
Theorem 3(c), Φγ is also a (d+ 1)-approximate potential function. J
I Corollary 5. Let G = 〈N,E, (wi)i∈N , (Si)i∈N , (ae, ke)e∈E〉 be a mildly congested instance
of WCG(d). If γe = 1, for every e ∈ E, then Φγ is a ee−1 -approximate potential function for
G, where e is the Euler’s number.
Proof Sketch. Since G is mildly congested, we have `e(Le(s)) ≥ (ke + 1)wmax, for every
resource e ∈ E and state s ∈ S(G), where wmax denotes the greatest weight in G. Under this
condition, we can restrict the proof of Theorem 3 to the case in which the generic subset of
player P is such that
∑
j∈P wj ≥ (ke + 1)wmax. With this condition in place, we have that,















By using the previous inequality, it is easy to prove that the expression (13) gets always
values in the range [1, ee−1 ], for every ke ≥ 1. The claim follows by applying Theorem 2. J
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4 Approximate price of stability
In this section we show an upper bound on the α-approximate price of stability, for α ∈
[d, d+ 1]. This bound is stated by Theorem 8, whose proof is based on Lemma 6 and Lemma
7 presented below.
I Lemma 6. Let G = 〈N,E, (wi)i∈N , (Si)i∈N , (ae, ke)e∈E〉 be an instance of WCG(d). Let
γe = ke + δ and δ ∈ [0, 1], for every resource e ∈ E. For every resource e ∈ E and every
non-empty subset of players P ⊆ N , we have


































where (17) follows from Definition 1 and the definition of γe, and (18) follows by applying








j and β = ke+1ke+δ . J
In the following lemma, we give bounds relating the value of the approximate potential
function for a given state to the social cost of that state.
I Lemma 7. Let G = 〈N,E, (wi)i∈N , (Si)i∈N , (ae, ke)e∈E〉 be an instance of WCG(d). Let
γ = (γe)e∈E, where γe = ke + δ and δ ∈ [0, 1]. For every state s ∈ S(G) we have
Φγ(s) ≤ C(s) ≤
2
1 + δΦγ(s). (19)
















In order to bound C(s)/Φγ(s), we consider the ratio between the t-th term in the numerator












. We get that the smallest ratio is
1 while the greatest one is maxt
ket+1
ket+δ
≤ 21+δ . It follows that, C(s)/Φγ(s) is at least 1 and at
most 21+δ , from which the claim follows. J
I Theorem 8. Let G = 〈N,E, (wi)i∈N , (Si)i∈N , (ae, ke)e∈E〉 be an instance of WCG(d). Then
PoSd+δ(G) ≤ 21+δ , for every δ ∈ [0, 1].
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Proof. Let Φγ be the function with γ = (γe)e∈E , where γe = ke + δ. Let o ∈ OPT (G)
be a social optimum. Let us consider any sequence of (d+ δ)-improvement moves starting
from o. From Theorem 3(c) we know that this sequence converges to a state which is a
(d + δ)-approximate pure Nash equilibrium which we denote by e. Moreover, along this
sequence of moves, Φγ is not increasing. Hence,
Φγ(e) ≤ Φγ(o). (21)
By applying Lemma 7 repeatedly to both o and e we obtain
C(e) ≤ 21 + δΦγ(e) ≤
2
1 + δΦγ(o) ≤
2
1 + δC(o),
where the second inequality follows from (21). From which the claim follows. J
5 Technical lemmas
In this section we present two technical lemmas. Lemma 9 is used in the proof of Theorem 3,
while Lemma 10 is used in the proof of Lemma 6.
I Lemma 9. For every x ∈ R>0, h ∈ Z≥1 and β ∈ R≥1, we have
(1 + x)h









β ] if β ∈ [1, h]
[ 1β , 1] if β ≥ h.
Proof. We have
(1 + x)h




































































































































































In order to bound (23), for every t ∈ [0, h] we consider the ratio between the coefficient of
the term xt in the numerator and the coefficient of the same term in the denominator. For
t = 0 the ratio is 1, while for t ∈ [1, h] the ratio is h+1−tβ . For the case β ∈ [1, h], we get
that the smallest ratio is 1/β while the greatest is h/β. It follows that, when β ∈ [1, h], the
expression in (23) is at least 1/β and at most h/β. For the case β ≥ h, we obtain that the
smallest is 1/β while the greatest ratio is 1df. Therefore, when β ≥ h, the expression in (23)
is at least 1/β and at most 1. From which the claim follows. J
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where the last inequality is due to the fact that y/x > 0. J
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